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Abstract 
There were 7 assassination attempts on U.S. presidents between 1973 and 2001. In this article, we 
critically examine coverage of each attack in the New York Times and the Washington Post, describing 
how the coverage employs therapeutic discourse frames that position the president as vulnerable 
and portray the attackers as lonely and demented outsiders. Noticing contradictions in this pattern, 
we also identify counter-frames, including those acknowledging the political motivations of the as-
sassins, the diminished public sphere that is a context for those actions, and the contradictions in a 
legal system that denies the insanity pleas of those framed so extensively as mentally ill. Political 
science, psychology, and law enforcement researchers have recognized that assassination attempts 
are often driven by rational political and economic concerns. Our analysis thus points to the need for 
further research exploring therapeutic framing techniques of other instances of political violence that 
may discourage publics from thinking critically about protest, violence, and tragedy in the United 
States. 
 
On March 30, 1981, John W. Hinckley, Jr. shot President Ronald Reagan in the chest and 
then–White House Press Secretary James Brady in the head. In response, New York Times 
columnist Jane Brody commented: “In this country nearly all assassins have been person-
ally, not politically, motivated.” Her column assessing the Hinckley attempt held increased 
civil liberties for the mentally ill accountable. In her column, she described all assassins—
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not just Hinckley—as deranged loners, mentally unstable, alienated persons—drifters 
“with a history of psychiatric problems” (Brody, 1981, p. A26). While that description 
might fit John Hinckley rather closely,1 it does not do so equally for other American would-
be assassins since 1973, who sometimes have articulated a mixture of political and psycho-
logical motives and expressed despair over having few viable outlets for their grievances. 
Their political and social critiques have appeared as closing paragraphs in news coverage 
that has framed their discontent largely in terms of personal psychological disturbance. 
The tendency of journalists to foreground the personal psychopathology of would-be as-
sassins has located these attacks in the private, deluded worlds of the attackers rather than 
as public moments of opposition or as markers of broader social anxiety. 
Cloud (1998) has labeled this dislocation of social problems into a private, familial, or 
psychological frame therapeutic discourse (see also Cloud, 2003a, 2003b; Rockler, 2003). Such 
discourse emphasizes individual responsibility for and the necessity of private rather than 
societal response to social problems. Cloud writes: 
 
The therapeutic refers to a set of political and cultural discourses that have 
adopted psychotherapy’s lexicon—the conservative language of healing, coping, 
adaptation, and restoration of a previously existing order—but in contexts of so-
ciopolitical conflict. The rhetorical function of therapeutic discourses in such con-
texts is to encourage audiences to focus on themselves and the elaboration of 
their private lives rather than to address and attempt to reform systems of social 
power in which they are embedded. (1988, p. xvi) 
 
As a news frame, the therapeutic can discredit and depoliticize the motivations behind 
protest in a way that contributes to a national consolation and healing. Cloud (1998) writes: 
“The framing of responses to the war [as to assassination attempts] represented a thera-
peutic displacement of political energy, effectively cordoning off and muting the voices of 
opposition . . . protecting the fragile social space from the anger of protesters” (p. 86). In 
the case of assassination attempts, media frames similarly discouraged a rounded discus-
sion of these actors as well as their desperate and self-destructive public acts. 
This study presents an analysis of the framing choices in newspaper coverage of seven 
political assassination attempts in the United States between 1973 and 2001 (Table 1).These 
cases share in common the fact that none was successful and all targeted sitting presidents 
or the White House. In addition, all occurred after 1973, a year that marked the beginning 
of a period in U.S. history of economic downturn (Harvey, 1989). The state of the U.S. 
economy is important for the current analysis because economic concerns were considered 
to be connected to some of these attacks (Clarke, 1982) and because Feierabend, Feiera-
bend, Nesvold, and Jaggar (1971) have observed correlations between economic and sys-
temic grievances and acts of political violence.2 
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Table 1. Assassins and Assassination Attempts under Examination 
Name Date Target Location Outcome Punishment 
Samuel Byck February 22, 1974 Richard Nixon Baltimore/ 
Washington 
Airport 
Byck kills self during 
unsuccessful hijack 
attempt 
 
Lynette Fromme September 5, 1975 Gerald Ford Sacramento, CA Pointed .45 caliber 
semiautomatic pistol 
at Ford; Secret Service 
grabs gun from 
Fromme 
Indicted federal 
charges—life in 
prison, Carswell, TX 
Sara J. Moore September 22, 1975 Gerald Ford San Francisco, CA Pointed .38 caliber 
Smith & Wesson at 
Ford; bystander 
grabs her arm, bullet 
deflected 
Pled guilty to 
attempted murder; 
life in federal prison, 
Dublin, CA 
John Hinckley March 30, 1981 Ronald Reagan Washington, DC Fired six shots from 
a DC Rohm RG14 
.22 caliber revolver; 
bullets struck Reagan, 
James Brady, Thomas 
Delahanty, and Tim-
othy McCarthy 
Found not guilty by 
reason of insanity in 
1981; confined to 
St. Elizabeth’s Mental 
Hospital, Washington, 
DC 
Frank Corder September 11, 1994 Bill Clinton Washington, DC 
(White House) 
Flew small Cessna 
airplane into White 
House compound; 
plane crashes into 
Magnolia tree 
planted by Andrew 
Jackson; Corder 
killed in crash 
 
Francisco Duran October 29, 1994 Bill Clinton Washington, DC 
(White House) 
Sprayed White House 
with a score of bullets 
from a semiautomatic 
rifle 
Sentenced to 40 years 
in federal prison 
Robert Pickett February 7, 2001 George W. Bush Washington, DC 
(White House) 
Held a five-shot 
revolver; was shot in 
the knee after a 
stand-off with Secret 
Service near the 
White House 
Charged with assault 
on a federal officer; 
pled to a 3-year 
prison term 
 
Furthermore, these assassination attempts all took place in years marked by growing 
political alienation and frustration. Although collective protest was recognized as a pow-
erful and legitimate form of political engagement during the 1960s, U.S. cultural life in-
creasingly emphasized private, individualized concerns during the decades thereafter 
(Gitlin, 1987, p. 424). Thus, the assassins’ attacks occurred in a climate in which political 
appetites had been whetted, but outlets for dissent were less accessible than in the recent 
past. While corporate media tend to assume as common sense the legitimacy of the existing 
social order (Hall, 1988), the political climate at the time of news coverage affects the polit-
ical tone of news coverage (Kumar, 2007). Thus, coverage of attempts on the president’s 
H O E R L ,  C L O U D ,  A N D  J A R V I S ,  C O M M U N I C A T I O N ,  C U L T U R E  &  C R I T I Q U E  2  (2 0 0 9 )  
4 
life highlights how the depoliticized climate of the United States after the 1960s informed 
media coverage of spectacular political events. 
 
Media Framing and Public Opinion Formation: A Critical Perspective on the News 
 
We approach the study of mass media from a perspective critical of the ways in which the 
media industry cultivates and circulates partial ways of seeing the world (Gans, 1979, 2004; 
Gerbner, Mowlana, & Schiller, 1996; Glasser & Salmon, 1995; Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, 
Clarke, & Roberts, 1978; Sparrow, 1999). Our primary interest is in the text rather than its 
producers or receivers; as previous research suggests, the agenda-setting (McCombs, 2004) 
and framing function (Gitlin, 1980) of news media is less a matter of the individual inten-
tions or strategies of particular reporters or editors than of how they are part of a much 
broader process on a national scale of constructing a hegemonic worldview (Hall et al., 
1978, pp. 53–80). Following Herman and Chomsky ([1988]/2002), we view news content as 
the outcome of the complex interaction among mechanisms of ideological filtration by 
pressure from editors, owners, and advertisers; standard newsgathering routines privileg-
ing political and economic elites; news values, including conventions of balance and a pref-
erence for drama; and the assumption of the primacy of the individual in society. In a 
famous study of news coverage of mugging, Hall et al. argue that because crime violates 
and thus marks the boundaries of national consensus, crime coverage “evokes threats to, 
but also reaffirms, the consensual morality of the society” (p. 66). “Action to stigmatize 
and punish those who break the law, taken by the agents formally appointed as the guard-
ians of public morality and order, stands as a dramatized symbolic reassertion of the values 
of society and of its limits of tolerance” (p. 66). 
On the whole, our analysis confirms the tendency of major news media to stigmatize 
the violent and reassure the nation by dramatically affirming “the consensual morality of 
society.” At the same time, however, we recognize that media hegemony is never a total 
accomplishment; news coverage sometimes reflects broader social struggle over particular 
issues in the presentation of contradictory frames within and across news articles (Kumar, 
2007). Below we describe both routine, individualistic frames and more complex and po-
liticized counter-frames that appear in recent news coverage of presidential assassination 
attempts. 
We identify media frames that appear within news articles about these events. The iden-
tification of media frames as a method has been engaged frequently by news media schol-
ars (Reese, Gandy, & Grant, 2001). A number of scholars have demonstrated how media 
frames can have important implications for public attitudes and perceptions of troubling 
events (Bateson, 1972; Entman, 1993; Gitlin, 1980; Goffman, 1974; Reese et al., 2001; Tuchman, 
1978). While diverse scholars have studied framing from a variety of perspectives (Reese 
et al., 2001), this article follows an interpretive and critical approach to the study of framing 
processes that attends to the ideological character of news practices. Although we consider 
the impact of some of the photographs contained in the coverage, our primary emphasis 
is on the ways in which propositional story content frames the assassination attempts. 
Gitlin argues that news frames employ particular principles of selection, emphasis, and 
exclusion to construct “persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation” 
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for news audiences (p. 7). Consequently, the ways in which journalists frame current 
events may encourage audiences to consider certain aspects of a problem as more salient 
than others (Entman, 1993), suggest that some spokespeople have more legitimacy than 
others do (Watkins, 2001), and defuse challenges to prevailing political authority by natu-
ralizing elite frames of social events as common sense (Gitlin, 1980). With few exceptions, 
in the case of assassination attempts, the idea of national vulnerability and the automatic 
resort to individualist explanations for violence urged individual blame rather than polit-
ical analysis of the attacks. 
 
News Coverage of Presidential Assassination Attempts 
 
In support of this argument, we conducted a critical reading of newspaper coverage during 
the week following the assassination attempts as featured in two major newspapers: the 
Washington Post and the New York Times. These papers are especially influential in the U.S. 
system because they set the national public’s agenda; there is considerable evidence that 
the issues identified in polls by citizens as the most salient correspond closely with cover-
age from national newspapers (McCombs, 2004; McCombs, Danielian, & Wanta, 1995). The 
two national newspapers also feature stories and frames frequently picked up by television 
news and regional papers (Gans, 1979). The New York Times and the Washington Post, spe-
cifically, have been found to be particularly significant for news on politics and the presi-
dency (Gans, 1979), surpassing the influence on opinion leaders of other newspapers, 
international sources, and news magazines during the time periods under study; further-
more, newspapers of national scope serve as supplements to television news for highly 
motivated and influential citizens (Shah & Scheufele, 2006, p. 5). Through our critical in-
terpretive analysis of each article in these two newspapers, we identify patterns of mes-
sages that structured the meaning of presidential assassination attempts between 1973 and 
2001 in ways that lent legitimacy to the presidency and depoliticized the acts of would-be 
assassins. 
The Washington Post and the New York Times covered attempts on the president’s life in 
220 articles and editorials; 95 articles and 24 editorials appeared in the Washington Post and 
93 articles and 8 editorials appeared in the New York Times. (These articles were gathered 
through Boolean searches for the names of each assassin in the WashingtonPost.com Histor-
ical Archives online database, and the ProQuest Historical Newspaper Database covering 
the New York Times 1877–present.) Similarities in coverage between these newspapers sug-
gest that both of these newspapers framed failed attempts on the president’s life in similar 
ways. We attend both to the specificities of the coverage of each individual case and to the 
broader consistent patterns in the characterization of would-be assassins. The number of 
articles about each attempt are identified in Table 2, and are distributed according to the 
day of the week in which a particular number of articles appeared in each newspaper. 
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Table 2. Number of Articles Covering Assassination Attempts in the New York Times and the Washington Post 
Assassin Date of attack Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 Total 
Samuel Byck Feb. 22, 1974 Feb. 23 Feb. 24 Feb. 25 Feb. 26 Feb. 27 Feb. 28 Feb. 29  
WP  2 2 0 0 2 1 0 7 
NYT  1 2 0 0 1 0 0 4 
Lynnette Frommea Sep. 5, 1975 Sep. 6 Sep. 7 Sep. 8 Sep. 9 Sep. 10 Sep. 11 Sep. 12  
WP  8 6 2 2 1 2 1 22 
NYT  5 3 3 1 3 1 2 18 
Sara J. Moore Sep. 22, 1975 Sep. 23 Sep. 24 Sep. 25 Sep. 26 Sep. 27 Sep. 28 Sep. 29  
WP  4 4 6 4 1 3 1 23 
NYT  6 6 4 3 1 3 0 23 
John Hinckley Mar. 30, 1981 Mar. 31 Apr. 1 Apr. 2 Apr. 3 Apr. 4 Apr. 5 Apr. 6  
WP  7 13 9 5 3 5 2 44 
NYT  5 8 7 7 4 8 0 39 
Frank Corder Sep. 11, 1994 Sep. 12 Sep. 13 Sep. 14 Sep. 15 Sep. 16 Sep. 17 Sep. 18  
WP  0 4 2 1 0 0 0 7 
NYT  0 3 2 1 0 0 0 6 
Francisco Duran Oct. 29, 1994 Oct. 30 Oct. 31 Nov. 1 Nov. 2 Nov. 3 Nov. 4 Nov. 5  
WP  1 3 2 1 1 1 1 10 
NYT  2 3 0 1 1 0 1 8 
Robert Pickett Feb. 7, 2001 Feb. 8 Feb. 9 Feb. 10 Feb. 11 Feb. 12 Feb. 13 Feb. 14  
WP  3 1 2 0 0 0 0 6 
NYT  2 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 
Note: Total number of articles: 220. WP = Washington Post; NYT, New York Times. 
a. The fact that the women get significantly more coverage than the men (with the exception of Hinckley, whose obsession with 
Jodie Foster and partial success in his attack make it noteworthy) suggests that there is a gender dimension to this coverage. 
Because gender prescriptions for women do not sanction violence or rage in the way that masculinity does, it is more noteworthy 
when a woman attempts to assassinate the president than when a man does. 
 
Both newspapers featured assassination attempts prominently in the first 2 days follow-
ing each incident. In general, a greater number of articles about the assassination attempts 
appeared in the 2 days immediately proceeding the events; more space was allotted to 
issues surrounding the assassination attempts during the first 2 days than on subsequent 
days; and more articles about the attacks began on the front pages of these newspapers 2 
days after the incidents than in the 5 days thereafter.3 Table 3 presents specific data regard-
ing the frequency, length, and front page placement of these articles. Coverage of the as-
sassination attempts continued into the week after the attacks; however, coverage in both 
papers tended to taper off as the week progressed. 
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Table 3. Frequency, Length, and Placement of Articles Covering Assassins 
 Paper Byck Fromme Moore Hinkley Corder Duran Pickett Total 
Number of articles and 
   editorials 
WP 7 228 23 44 7 10 6 119 
NYT 4 18 23 39 6 8 4 102 
Within the first 2 days WP 4 14 8 20 4 4 4 58 
NYT 3 8 12 13 3 5 3 46 
Start on front page WP 4 8 9 22 2 5 3 53 
NYT 1 7 12 12 2 3 1 38 
Start on front page first or 
second day after attempt 
WP 2 7 4 12 2 3 3 33 
NYT 1 5 9 5 2 3 1 26 
Over 1,200 words long WP 2 4 7 15 2 2 3 35 
NYT 0 4 8 9 2 0 1 24 
Over 1,200 words long on 
first or second day after 
attempt 
WP 1 4 4 8 2 2 2 23 
NYT 0 3 3 4 2 1 1 14 
WP = Washington Post; NYT, New York Times 
 
In addition to sharing similarities in terms of the frequency of coverage, quantity of 
articles, and space allotted to coverage of presidential assassination attempts, articles 
within these premier newspapers framed the coverage around similar subjects that con-
tributed the framing of attempts on the president’s life and of the motives of the would-be 
assassins. Most often, articles focused on issues surrounding the security of the president 
and/or the White House. The security theme was especially prominent in the Washington 
Post, which can be explained by the location of several attacks at the site of the White House 
(in the cases of Corder, Duran, and Pickett) or in Washington, DC (in the case of Hinckley). 
When articles attended to the backgrounds of would-be assassins (the second most prom-
inent theme in newspaper coverage), articles featured their psychological states or past 
histories of delinquent or criminal behavior. Newspaper headlines, as indicators of an ar-
ticle’s or editorial’s subject focus, frequently highlighted these themes; however, these 
themes appeared in other articles as well. Likewise, photographs depicted these subjects 
most frequently as well. Of the 201 photographs that appeared alongside newspaper cov-
erage featuring these themes, 35 photographs depicted the president or the White House 
and 60 portrayed the attempted assassin. As federal cases against would-be assassins who 
survived their attacks built toward the middle and end of the week following the attacks, 
newspaper coverage also reported on events and outcomes of their trial hearings. Table 4 
identifies the number of headlines featuring each of these subjects. Only two articles were 
introduced with headlines indicating a politically based motive for attacking the president 
(“Hijacker had,” 1974; “Miss Moore,” 1975). As we argue, it is notable that only two articles 
featured political problems and public concerns as reasons for presidential assassination 
attempts. 
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Table 4. Subjects Featured in Headlines of Articles Covering Assassination Attempts 
Headline theme Byck Moore Fromme Hinkley Corder Duran Pickett 
Total (% of 
total number 
of articles) 
President’s security; White House 
security. Examples: “Ford escapes 
harm as shot is deflected” (Shabecoff, 
1975, p. A1); “Sharper scrutiny of White 
House safety” (Pear, 1994b, p. A14) 
WP: 0 WP: 11 WP: 9 WP: 19 WP: 4 WP: 3 WP: 1 47 (36%) 
NYT: 0 NYT: 9 NYT: 8 NYT: 12 NYT: 2 NYT: 1 NYT: 2 34 
Background of attempted assassin. 
Example: “In Colorado town, gunman 
was just another quiet guy” 
(Claiborne, 1994, p. A6) 
WP: 2 WP: 6 WP: 6 WP: 9 WP: 2 WP: 4 WP: 2 31 (28%) 
NYT: 0 NYT: 5 NYT: 6 NYT: 14 NYT: 3 NYT: 2 NYT: 0 30 
Mental state of assassin (sorted from 
the category above). Examples: 
“Desperate sense of isolation” (Flume, 
1975, p. A14); “John Hinkley’s obsession” 
(Williams, 1981, B1) 
WP: 2 WP: 5 WP: 3 WP: 9 WP: 2 WP: 3 WP: 2 26 (21%) 
NYT: 0 NYT: 3 NYT: 5 NYT: 9 NYT: 3 NYT: 1 NYT: 0 21 
Federal case developments. Example: 
“Grand jury indicts Fromme” 
(Grand jury, 1975, p. A10) 
WP: n/a WP: 0 WP: 2 WP: 1 WP: n/a WP: 2 WP: 1 6 (9%) 
NYT: n/a NYT: 2 NYT: 5 NYT: 3 NYT: n/a NYT: 3 NYT: 1 14 
WP = Washington Post; NYT, New York Times 
 
Media Frames of Assassination Attempts as Psychopathology 
 
Our analysis of the dominant media frames reveals several ways in which newspaper cov-
erage depoliticizes assassination attempts, priming the public to make sense of these at-
tacks in terms of a presidency and nation vulnerable to the deranged acts of lonely and 
deluded attackers. These findings correspond with Bennett’s (2002) observations that nar-
rative patterns in national newspaper coverage frequently personalize news stories, fram-
ing political controversies in terms of conflict between individuals. Bennett suggests that 
this narrative pattern distracts attention from structural conditions that contribute to po-
litical problems. Our analysis extends Bennett’s scholarship; newspapers decontextualized 
assassination attempts from the political and social contexts in which they occurred by 
depicting would-be attackers as politically isolated and mentally instable. Intriguingly, 
therapeutic news frames disappear when it comes time to hold the attackers accountable 
in the court system. While coverage highlights the personalized and therapeutic frame to 
understand assassination attempts, the coverage also allows clues in a subordinate and 
contradictory frame as to the assassins’ motives, which includes an oblique recognition of 
the assassins’ desire for agency in a diminished public sphere. This frame, while secondary 
in the news coverage, resonates with the preponderance of political science, criminal jus-
tice, and psychology research regarding assassination as political violence. In this light, we 
conclude this article with a discussion of the implications of such narrow media frames of 
other violent acts, including school shootings and terrorism. 
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The (Vulnerable) National Body and Home 
An initial theme in coverage of assassination attempts can be spotted in all seven of these 
cases: the construction of the president and White House—standing in metonymically for 
the nation—as vulnerable and in need of defense. Although hardly surprising, this pattern 
becomes critical to the future framing techniques appearing in the news. Table 5 presents 
examples of the heightened susceptibility that followed Samuel Byck’s attempt to hijack a 
plane and fly it into the White House, Lynnette Fromme’s attempt to shoot President Ger-
ald Ford in Sacramento, Sara J. Moore’s attempt to shoot Ford in San Francisco, John Hinck-
ley’s shooting of President Ronald Reagan in Washington, DC, Frank Corder’s flying a 
small plane into the White House, and Francisco Duran’s and Robert Pickett’s attempts to 
shoot at the White House. In each of these cases, the linguistic choices in Table 5 highlight 
the ways that these attacks portray the difficulties of protecting the presidential body and 
home. 
 
Table 5. Examples of Articles Featuring Heightened Vulnerability after All Seven Attempts 
Attacker Coverage 
Samuel Byck “The Secret Service had ‘no foolproof system for safeguarding’ the White House from 
an air attack.” (Landers, 1974a, p. A1) 
Lynette Fromme “Despite its computers, and despite the manifold increase in manpower and money 
since the assassination of President Kennedy, the Secret Service was unable today to 
prevent Miss Fromme from approaching within arm’s length of the President with a 
pistol.” (Shabecoff, 1975, p. A1) 
Sarah J. Moore “Moore and Fromme’s attacks raised questions about the personal safety of the President. 
. . . Questions about the President’s safety, security, and well-being . . . fell in torrents 
like rain.” (Daniel, 1975, p. A1) 
John Hinckley “Treasury Secretary Donald T. Regan today announced a formal inquiry into the question 
of how John W. Hinckley Jr., the man charged with the assassination attempt, got to 
within 10 feet of the President. ‘I feel a formal review should be conducted regarding 
the events surrounding the assassination attempt in order to assure the continued 
effectiveness of our security systems,’ said Mr. Regan, whose department includes the 
Secret Service.” (Raines, 1981a, p. A1) 
Frank Corder “Mr. Corder . . . showed that if a confused, intoxicated man with limited flying skills 
could almost manage to hit the President’s bedroom with no resistance, then a determined, 
skilled assassin could inflict far greater damage with such an approach.” (Labaton, 
1994b, p. A30) 
Roberto Duran “It was the second uncontested attack on the executive mansion in less than 6 weeks, 
and it immediately raised anew questions about the safety of a President living not just 
in the midst of a major city, but barely 50 yards from its six-lane main street.” (Schmitt, 
1994, p. A1) 
Robert Pickett “This was the kind of incident that confirms not only the need for strict security 
measures around the president but the value of constant rehearsal. The White House 
and the president are always potential targets, of course, and the Secret Service is always 
trying to balance the value of unobtrusive security and security that is plainly visible. 
(“The White House Shooting,” 2001, p. A30) 
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After the president and or his home have been depicted as exposed, the articles in our 
sample commented on his safety in two ways, depending upon the nature of the assassi-
nation attempt. When the attack targeted the chief executive, descriptions of his recovery 
served as a metonym for the resilience and recovery of the nation; when the attack targeted 
the White House, discussions of a threatened 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue served as a met-
onym for the need to protect a vulnerable country. These symbolic connections provided 
the groundwork for the therapeutic frame as they emphasized the healing and security of 
treasured American icons and eschewed a discussion of political, economic, or systemic 
conditions related to the attacks. 
First, consider newspaper coverage of direct threats to Presidents Ford and Reagan. 
Ford was not wounded in either of the attempts on his life, and newspapers largely de-
scribed his recovery in terms of his ability to get back to work. Following the attack by 
Fromme, for instance, the New York Times quoted Ford as saying that the Secret Service had 
done a “superb job” to enable him to “get on with the rest of the day’s schedule” (Naugh-
ton, 1975b, p. A3). A photograph of Ford in a subsequent article reinforced this message 
by portraying Ford smiling and shaking hands with spectators (Naughton, 1975c, p. 1). 
Coverage of Ford as resilient continued in news portrayals of Moore’s attack later that 
month. For instance, Naughton (1975d) quoted Ford as saying that he would continue to 
greet “spectators face to face” because he wanted to maintain “personal contact and (a) 
relationship with the American people” (p. A21). In these cases, Ford’s threatened body 
and schedule were described as returning to normal. So, too, was his relationship with the 
citizenry. As Cloud (1998) has noted, the language of recovering and getting on with things 
in spite of trauma is a common characteristic of a therapeutic discourse that can discourage 
publics from dwelling on the causes and solutions of the crisis or trauma. In this case, Pres-
ident Ford was depicted as moving on from the attack; the language and imagery of these 
articles encouraged the reading public to do so as well. 
Because of the critical nature of his attack, Reagan’s recovery garnered more extensive 
news coverage than did the attempts on other presidents. While he was recuperating in 
the hospital, the New York Times reported that Reagan experienced “soreness in his rib 
cage,” caused by the “six-inch incision in the left side of his chest,” and had difficulty breath-
ing in the days following his surgery (Raines, 1981b, p. A1). Despite serious wounds, he 
was described to evince “superhuman strength” (Raines, 1981b, p. A1). New York Times 
journalist Raines reported on conversations with Reagan’s doctors: “Asked if it was ‘med-
ically extraordinary’ for Reagan to have walked into the hospital, Dr. O’Leary said, ‘Maybe 
not medically extraordinary, but just short of that’” (Raines, 1981b, p. A1). Coverage of 
Reagan, like that of Ford, attempted to reassure of the enduring stability of the government 
by focusing on quotidian details of the president’s activities that signified a return to nor-
malcy. Raines (1981b) also reported that Reagan “met with senior aides . . . and signed a 
bill while sitting up in his bed at the George Washington University Hospital” (p. A1). In 
this article, Reagan’s ability to carry on his presidential obligations was not thwarted by 
Hinckley’s attack. Photographs of Reagan also emphasized his recovery. Unlike coverage 
of Ford, photographic images of Reagan were largely excluded from newspaper coverage 
until the fifth day after the attack, when Reagan was well enough to stand upright and 
walk outside of his hospital room (Lyons, 1981, p. E2; Okie & Lescazie, 1981, p. A1). That 
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he was able to recover so quickly offered reassurance on literal and metaphorical levels 
that the political body, though vulnerable, was resilient. Perhaps because Reagan was the only 
president in this sample to be physically injured, his attack and recuperation stood out in 
coverage as a symbol of national health. News narratives that focused on the vulnerability, 
recovery, and symbolism of the president’s targeted body encouraged a connection with 
the recuperating chief executive and a consideration of the nation’s relationship to him 
rather than the contemplation of the political, economic, or systemic motivations behind 
these attacks. 
Complementing coverage of attempts on the president’s life, newspaper coverage of the 
four threats to the White House in this study emphasized the importance of protecting the 
national home. For example, after Byck’s effort to hijack a plane to fly into the White House, 
Washington Post journalist Landers and Robinson (1974, p. A10) quoted Secret Service 
spokesman Jack Warner as saying, “[W]e are constantly evaluating our security proce-
dures at the White House” and noted that Warner “refused to comment on what, if any, 
precautions existed against an air attack such as the one planned by Byck.” Twenty years 
later, following Corder’s attack on the White House, New York Times reporter Labaton cited 
Marlin Fitzwater’s (former press secretary to Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush) 
concern that “there’s no predicting or preventing aerial attacks. It’s the ultimate fear for 
security people.” Labaton also quoted Bill Gulley (former director of the White House Mil-
itary Office) who noted that: “You wouldn’t believe—nobody could possibly believe—
how vulnerable the White House is” (Labaton, 1994a, p. A1). Columnist Dowd (1994) as-
serted that the scene of the Corder plane crash provided “frightening proof . . . that the 
White House is more vulnerable than anyone admits” (p. A1). Likewise, a New York Times 
editorial column depicted Corder’s attempt as a rupture of widespread belief in the ability 
of the United States to protect its citizens: “The woebegone citizen Frank Eugene Corder 
hit something bigger and more fragile than the White House with his stolen Cessna. He 
crashed into and damaged American faith in the protective capabilities of technology and 
security forces” (“Mad Flight,” 1994, p. A18). These articles invited readers to focus on the 
defenselessness of the(ir) White House and the importance of protecting it rather than on 
the causes for these attacks. 
News coverage credited the Secret Service and individual citizens for restoring order to 
the nation’s home and, in a sense, credited them with symbolically resuscitating the na-
tion’s health. Following Duran’s attack on the White House, President Clinton was quoted 
as praising “the courage of those who had subdued Mr. Duran, saying the gunman was 
captured ‘because ordinary citizens who were standing there did their duty’” (Schmitt, 
1994, p. A30). After Pickett’s similar type of attack on the White House, one New York Times 
column suggested that “only confidence in the Secret Service and in the fundamentally 
peaceable nature of the vast majority of people could guarantee such a quick return to 
business as usual” (“The White House Shooting,” 2001, p. A30). News narratives like these 
called attention to privatized responses to social problems—a key characteristic of the ther-
apeutic frame. The threat of harm to the national body directly invokes a therapeutic re-
sponse, rather than an explanatory or critical way of regarding traumatic events. In 
applauding a “quick return to business as usual,” these texts leave unexamined the poten-
tial political, economic, or systemic motivations of protestors in news coverage. The theme 
H O E R L ,  C L O U D ,  A N D  J A R V I S ,  C O M M U N I C A T I O N ,  C U L T U R E  &  C R I T I Q U E  2  (2 0 0 9 )  
12 
of mental illness and maladjustment in the news coverage of assassination attempts, the 
other predominant framework in the articles we examined, put the political issues sur-
rounding assassination attempts into further obscurity. 
 
The Lonely and Demented Outsider 
At the same time that journalistic frames called attention to the recovery and protection of 
vulnerable American icons, they also identified those who would threaten the president as 
outside of the mainstream; indeed, as outside the citizenry itself. For example, President 
Ford was quoted as saying that he “would not blame Californians for actions of ‘1’ indi-
vidual” after he learned of Fromme’s attempt to shoot him (Naughton, 1975a, p. A1). An-
other New York Times article featured the same framing of the event, and included a 
statement by House Republican Leader John T. Rhodes of Arizona who suggested that 
Fromme’s attempt to assassinate Ford represented “one crackpot[’s]” effort to “produce 
chaos” (“Mrs. Ford,” 1975, p. 26). These characterizations of assassination attempts as the 
work of lone, psychologically disturbed outsiders may have provoked newspaper readers 
to feel as if they had more in common with the chief executive (whose body and home they 
were invited to share) than their fellow citizen (who had been depicted as an “other”). 
Would-be assassins were also frequently labeled as social isolates via the words of 
neighbors, co-workers, and relatives. One named citizen, Renee Goldstein, who was famil-
iar with Byck, told reporters he “was a loner” (Richards, 1974. p. M1). One of Hinckley’s 
neighbors, Thomas J. Murphy, was quoted as describing Hinckley as “a rather impersonal 
guy,” and another neighbor, Dr. Craig Van Buskirk, added that Hinckley “wasn’t the type 
of guy who made friends. . . . He’s the type of guy you’d say ‘hi’ to and he wouldn’t say 
‘hi’ back” (Crewdson, 1981, p. A2). News articles included assessments by John Corder, 
who described his brother as a “loner who would not talk about his problems” (Labaton, 
1994a, p. A1); Duran’s neighbor, who shared with the press that (Duran) “never liked to 
talk much” (Johnson, 1994, p. A14); and hospital officials, who referred to Pickett as “sub-
dued and silent” (Sanger, 2001, p. A 26). In a sense, the inclusion of these statements in 
news coverage marginalized the voice of the attackers by suggesting that in social interac-
tions they had “nothing to say” and “could not fit in.” Making sense of these attacks in 
terms of interpersonal failings departs from the aforementioned research in political sci-
ence and criminal justice. This editorial move also put into the foreground an understand-
ing of these individuals as isolated, a pattern that may discourage readers from thinking 
critically about the attacks. 
News coverage also highlighted specifics on the attackers’ personal and professional 
struggles. Reporters described how several would-be assassins had broken marriages or 
came from broken homes. For example, Washington Post reporter Landers (1974a) detailed 
how Byck’s wife divorced him 6 months prior to his assassination attempt (p. A1), and New 
York Times columnist Dowd (1994) described how Corder’s third marriage ended in the 
weeks prior to his attack (p. A1). Likewise, newspaper reports indicated that Moore was 
married and divorced twice. Moore’s brother, Sydney Kahn, told a reporter that Moore 
“had been adopted by her grandmother, now Mrs. C. E. Bailey, as a child and never knew 
her mother” (Malcolm, 1975, p. A1). 
H O E R L ,  C L O U D ,  A N D  J A R V I S ,  C O M M U N I C A T I O N ,  C U L T U R E  &  C R I T I Q U E  2  (2 0 0 9 )  
13 
Referring to assassins’ economic problems, Byck was described as “unemployed” (Rich-
ards, 1974, p. M3), Moore as having “infrequent jobs” (Malcolm, 1975, p. A1), and Hinckley 
as “a follower, not a leader, and . . . basically fairly lazy” (Treatser, 1981, p. A19). These 
references to the intended assassins’ occupational struggles were further traced back to 
their academic failures. The New York Times reported that Fromme had dropped out of 
El Camino Junior College in Torrance, California (McFadden, 1975, p. A 26); that Hinckley 
never graduated from college (although he studied “off and on” at Texas Tech University); 
and that Pickett dropped out of school after being dismissed in the 1980s from a job at the 
IRS (Sanger, 2001, p. A26). 
Significantly, in these instances, journalists acknowledged economic and professional 
hardships as affecting the lives of these would-be assassins. The coverage stopped short, 
however, of connecting the personal hardship of the attackers to the broader social context 
of economic recession and generalized economic anxiety. Instead, the press coverage of the 
attempts followed a pattern identified by Cloud (1998), who has argued that therapeutic 
discourse encourages audiences to “think of crisis, resolution, change, and stability as per-
sonal issues rather than as structural ones” (p. 160); and that in the contemporary system: 
“We are asked to shoulder the responsibility for change as individuals, no matter the extent 
of our suffering or the structural causes of our despair” (p. 165). The dislocation of atten-
tion to social issues like economic recession and social inequality into the realm of personal 
suffering and responsibility is the hallmark of the therapeutic frame. 
Other news coverage highlighted the attempted assassins’ history of deviant social be-
havior. For instance, one article in the New York Times called attention to Moore’s interest 
“in the fringes of radical groups, drugs, and easy sex” (Malcolm, 1975, p. A1). Another 
story suggested that Ford’s other would-be assassin, Fromme, had belonged to a violent 
fringe group tied to Charles Manson and had been arrested “more than a dozen times on 
various charges ranging from drug possession and petty theft to robbery and murder” 
(McFadden, 1975, p. A1). Stories of Corder’s attempt to assassinate President Clinton sim-
ilarly described his history of drug use and attempts to sell crack cocaine the day prior to 
his assassination attempt (Pear, 1994a, p. A20). 
The explicit soliciting of psychiatric opinion further enforces the therapeutic frame. One 
journalist reported that Byck had been committed to a mental hospital for manic depres-
sion and wanted help very badly. The same article stressed Byck’s admission of having 
psychotic fantasies, and cited FBI investigator Thomas Farrow’s assessment that Byck 
“must have had tremendous weight on his mind if not mentally disturbed” (Witkin, 1974, 
p. A1). The Washington Post also discussed Byck’s psychological problems, quoting psychi-
atrist John Lyon, who explained that Byck “cannot live with the limitations of his own 
personality, and prefers to build a high wall around himself where he can entertain his 
fantasies” (Landers, 1974b, p. A3). Reporters similarly focused on the mental delusions of 
Moore and Corder. Moore “lived in a fantasy world,” had “violent fits of temper,” made 
“wild threats,” and was described as “confused” and “disturbed” (Malcolm, 1975, p. A1). 
Corder was depicted as suffering from hopelessness and depression and, in one particu-
larly literary description, “vertiginous moods” (Dowd, 1994a, p. A1). Another journalist 
noted that Corder told a friend that he felt so hopeless that he considered flying a plane on 
a suicide mission to the White House (Pear, 1994, p. A20). 
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Following Hinckley’s assassination attempt, one New York Times article cited multiple 
psychiatrists and psychologists, all of whom attested to the pathological mental states of 
assassins throughout U.S history. Notably, Dr. Zigmond Lebensohn, a Washington psy-
chiatrist, was quoted as saying that assassinations in the United States are often “the prod-
uct of a single mentally disturbed person who is alienated from society, who feels like a 
zero, is wanted by no one and can’t get a job” (Brody, 1981, p. A26). Twenty-three years 
later, a citizen was cited by the press as identifying an assassin as a crazy loner: Following 
Corder’s attempt, columnist Dowd (1994) quoted the words of Patrick Porter as he looked 
at the yellow police tapes on the South Lawn of the White House: “It just proves you can 
make all the plans in the world and there’s nothing you can do to plan against a lunatic 
who doesn’t think rationally” (p. A1). The attribution of unreason to anti-establishment 
violence encourages readers to disregard other motivations, which in several cases were 
explicitly political in character. Acknowledging the experience of the assassin possibly 
could open up consideration of the political analysis and grievances they put forward. 
 
A Counter-frame and a Contradiction 
 
Although news coverage featured therapeutic news frames that narrowed political analy-
sis to the experience of individuals, the articles that we examined did not enact a complete 
retreat into the therapeutic. One counter-frame and one pronounced contradiction emerged 
from our analysis: The counter-frame attended to how the would-be assassins sought pub-
lic, political outlets for their anger and criticism before they resorted to violence; the con-
tradiction appeared in the legal discourse surrounding these cases that focuses on the 
culpability of the assassins for attacks on the presidency. This aforementioned counter-
frame emerged in instances in which the newspapers let readers “‘hear” the assassin’s 
voice. 
 
Counter-frame 1: Desperation and Diminished Publics 
The New York Times and the Washington Post allocated space to quotations and descriptions 
of artifacts from the would-be assassins. These mentions occurred most often in the second 
day following each assassination attempt, and in the bottom paragraphs of the articles. In 
this way, reporters attended to quotations of assassins well after the news frames of the 
“Chief Executive as vulnerable” and attackers as “lonely, demented outsiders” had been 
established; that is, well after the assassins were isolated, neutralized, and pathologized in 
the news. 
Intriguingly, when they were present, the assassins’ voices provided a stark contrast to 
reporters’ dominant frames as the statements from the attackers often alluded to political, 
economic, and systemic frustrations. For instance, in an interview with the New York Times, 
Moore (previously active in “radical” groups) described her attempt on Ford’s life as an 
“ultimate protest against the system.” As she explained her actions, she told reporters that 
she wanted the government to “face the realities of some of the things they put in motion” 
(1975, p. 30). While Fromme was not quoted directly, her roommate Sandra Goode told 
reporters that Fromme was concerned that “no one [was] doing anything to help the coun-
try.” According to Goode, Fromme complained that prevailing political institutions failed 
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to address problems such as “air and water pollution” and dishonesty in the Nixon and 
Ford administrations. As Fromme’s surrogate affirmed, Fromme’s assassination attempt 
represented the culmination of “many, many problems” (Turner, 1975, p. A1). Schmitt’s 
(1994) article in the New York Times on the Duran attack also indicated that Duran may 
have been motivated by political considerations. Schmitt’s article noted that prior to the 
attack, “Duran grilled a fellow bystander on the man’s views about the nation’s immigra-
tion policies” (A30) and described how bumper stickers on Duran’s car denounced Attor-
ney General Janet Reno and the gun control movement. One sticker read: “Those who beat 
their guns into plows will plow for those who don’t” (A30). By including these details 
toward the bottom of the article, Schmitt acknowledged that political issues may have 
played a part in the motive for Duran’s attempt to shoot President Clinton from the White 
House lawn. 
Other articles closed by mentioning the economic and broader systemic concerns of the 
attackers. One story detailed how Pickett had sent a letter to his employer, the Internal 
Revenue Service, in which he claimed that the organization failed to provide adequate 
treatment for his mental health problems when he worked for the IRS (“Authorities Plan,” 
2001, p. A14). Another addressed how Sara Jane Moore called her attempt on Ford “kind 
of an ultimate protest against the system.” Because she had served the FBI as an informant 
about Left organizations, Moore was extremely isolated from movements and collectives 
that might have channeled her motivation to protest in a useful direction. Because of that 
sense of isolation, she explains, “I did not want to kill somebody, but there comes a point 
when the only way you can make a statement is to pick up a gun. . . . I knew I was rapidly 
reaching a point that all the avenues of taking action were being closed, one at a time. . . . 
I wanted them to face the realities of some of the things they put in motion” (“Miss Moore,” 
1975, p. 30). 
Coverage of Byck put this sentiment most poignantly in a 1974 article that featured his 
question: “How can I, by myself, possibly be a public gathering?” (“Hijacker,” 1974, p. 34). 
Alone, he had been picketing the White House in demand of Nixon’s impeachment. Although 
he was introduced in coverage as a longtime manic-depressive, his description of his mo-
tivations for protest seemed to have little to do with his mental health. In one article, he 
was quoted as saying: “If I had the power to give everyone something, I’d get them to give 
a damn” (“Hijacker,” 1974, p. 34). In another column, which drew from a tape he had sent 
to columnist Jack Anderson, Byck is quoted as saying: 
 
I call myself a grain of sand on the beach called the U.S. of A. There are over 211 
million grains of sand, and on the beach that we call Earth there are over 3 billion 
grains of sand. But can one individual, one grain of sand, strike fear into the rul-
ing classes so that they will become more compassionate and more understand-
ing and cognizant of the needs of the populace, the many, many people? (quoted 
in Landers & Robinson, 1974, A1) 
 
In these remarks, one can hear the desire on the part of Byck and Moore to represent people 
other than themselves and to involve others in questioning and protest. Both felt that other 
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avenues of being heard were either nonexistent or inadequate to their needs. In some con-
sonance with this counter-frame, a Hollywood film called The Assassination of Richard 
Nixon, starring Sean Penn as Byck, appeared in 2004 (Mueller, 2004). The film establishes 
a point of view sympathetic with Byck, who is portrayed as a righteously angry but inef-
fective businessman trying to find an outlet for his outrage. The fictionalized events of the 
film include Byck’s attempt to join the Black Panthers, apparently to emphasize Byck’s 
desire for a political outlet and underscore political motivations of his actions. A review 
called the film “a discomfiting look at a man determined to leave his mark on the world, 
only to become a footnote” (Fennessey, 2007). 
Such remarks indicate how Byck and Moore, lacking channels and fora in which they 
might persuade others to become part of a campaign of critique and social transformation, 
expressed their sense of limited personal agency. This more critical frame was subordinate 
to the primary therapeutic one. While the assassins’ desperate attempts to have a public 
impact did garner attention, the sort of attention provided by journalists in almost every 
case reduced assassins’ often complex political motivations to personal derangement, de-
flecting the open moment of political crisis away from deliberation about inflation, gas 
prices, welfare, workplace exploitation, sexism, environmental destruction, poverty, or 
racism—all present in the assassins’ discourse—and toward an interpretation that framed 
disaffection as pathology. 
 
A Troubling Contradiction: Guilty by Reason of Insanity 
Although the discourse of psychopathology infused newspaper interpretations of assassi-
nation attempts in the United States, Hinckley was the only would-be assassin whose law-
yer successfully defended him with an insanity plea. As illustrated in Table 1, the other 
assassins either died in their attempts (Byck and Corder), were indicted (Fromme), were 
convicted (Duran), or pled to charges (Moore and Pickett). The contradiction between 
newspaper treatments of would-be assassins as pathologically ill and the legal outcomes 
of these attempts that held these individuals accountable was especially clear in the cover-
age of Duran and Pickett. 
In Duran’s case, his lawyers tried to enter an insanity plea for their client, one that mir-
rored the news’ construction of him as pathological and lonely. First, the legal team tried 
to convince a federal judge to conduct his trial in two phases to allow him to use an insanity 
defense if necessary. They were unsuccessful in doing so (“Insanity Defense Ruling,” 1995, 
p. B02). Then, Duran’s lawyers attempted an insanity defense, which was rejected by a 
federal jury after the prosecution “called more than 60 witnesses to show that Duran had 
talked often of anarchy and that he hated government in general and Clinton in particular” 
(Locy, 1995, D01).4 Although news coverage immediately following the event emphasized 
Duran’s isolation, the Washington Post ran a different assessment of Duran 6 months later 
when it was time to sentence him. At that time, journalist Locy quoted U.S. Attorney Eric 
H. Holder as saying: “The jury’s rejection of Duran’s insanity defense also was important. 
. . . Very often in society, people try to use excuses to deflect responsibility. . . . This jury 
has sent a message to people like this that bogus excuses will not be tolerated” (Locy, 1995, 
D01). 
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At first, news coverage dismissed Pickett as a crazy person. However, Pickett’s trial dis-
avowed attempts to recognize him as insane. In the discussion of charges being filed 
against him, one reporter commented: “While officials said there was no rush to file 
charges against Mr. Pickett, they also said they were not being hindered by accounts that 
he is mentally ill” (“Authorities Plan,” 2001, p. A14). The authorities and the reporter indi-
cated that mediated constructions of Pickett’s mental illness did not provide conclusive 
knowledge that he was psychologically disturbed. In both the Duran and Pickett cases, 
then, newspaper accounts retreated from pathological characterizations of these attempted 
assassins when it came time for them to appear in court. 
There is a troubling irony in coverage that frames assassins as mentally ill and a legal 
system that rejects such classifications. Perhaps, the case of assassination attempts reflects 
a broader pattern with regard to the diminution of the public sphere in terms of both ther-
apy and individual culpability. Criticism that exposes this kind of fracture or contradiction 
in news coverage may open up space for contextual thinking about extreme, as well as 
more moderate, forms of protest in the United States. 
 
Considering Assassination Attempts as Protest 
 
We are not alone in recognizing the political and economic motivations of actual and 
would-be assassins. A considerable body of literature has emphasized that they are only 
sometimes mentally ill and are often motivated by goals or problems that may be shared 
by other individuals. To date, researchers have explored what motivates an assassin or 
would-be assassin (Freedman, 1971; Greening, 1971), how assassinations in other countries 
are regarded as political and economic (Crotty, 1971; Feierabend et al., 1971), and how 
public sympathy for the president increases, and support for public protest decreases, after 
an assassination attempt (Appelton, 2000; Yuchtman-Yaar, 1999). Scholars have also illus-
trated how the meaning of an assassination is negotiated in the discourse following the 
event (Edelman & Simon, 1971; Nachman, 1997), how faith is restored in political institu-
tions (Goldzwig & Sullivan, 1995; Vande Berg, 1995), how bonds to national unity are 
reestablished (Schwartz, 1991), and how national cohesion is promoted to provide conso-
lation after an attack (Zelizer, 1992). 
National security officials, too, have acknowledged the significance of political and eco-
nomic contexts of assassination attempts. Notably, Robert Fein (a psychologist for the U.S. 
Secret Service) and Brian Vossekuil (a Deputy Special Agent Charge for the Intelligence 
Division of the U.S. Secret Service) produced a guidebook for law enforcement officials 
that summarized extensive research on assassination attempts of highly visible U.S. indi-
viduals (including the president). There they advanced several key arguments, including 
that law enforcement professionals: (a) can be taught to begin to “identify and neutralize 
people” who pose a threat to public officials (Fein & Vossekuil 2000, p. v), and (b) must not 
believe the myths that assassinations are solely a product of mental illness or derangement. 
On this latter point, Fein and Vossekuil explained that “mental illness only rarely plays a 
key role in assassination behaviors” (p. 13), and that “assassinations and attacks on public 
officials and figures are the products of understandable and often discernable processes of 
thinking and behavior” (p. 15). Moreover, in their minds, “most people who attack others 
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perceive the attack as the means to a goal or a way to solve a problem” and “an individual’s 
motives and selection of a target are directly connected” (p. 15). 
Freedman (1971) argued similarly, noting how it is much easier for attackers to commit 
acts of violence against someone they know or someone who is geographically close to 
them. For this reason, Freedman encourages scholars to distinguish between “violent acts” 
(the most common types of violence, most often committed against spouses and neighbors) 
and “violent political acts” (far less common and far more public). For Freedman, the per-
sonal murderer “violates his conscience,” whereas the political murderer “kills a stranger 
after careful, secretive planning” and “does so for an ideal” (p. 151). 
Clarke (1982) offered parallel findings. Of the 15 American assassins he studied, only 
three were identified as psychopaths. According to Clarke, politically motivated assassins 
 
represent the primary notion official explanations have sought to deny; that is, 
some assassins are rational extremists who have acted for political rather than 
personal reasons. . . . Moreover, the strong, ethnic, class, and sectional grievances 
associated with the motives of these subjects were shared by millions of others, 
either in this country or elsewhere. It is from such reservoirs of resentment that 
these assassins spring—not the broken homes, unresolved oedipal crises, delu-
sions, paranoia, desire for recognition, and so forth that form the basis for most 
previous explanations of their acts. (pp. 262–263) 
 
Other scholars have underscored the connection between an attacker’s motivations, the 
public nature of the presidency, and broader societal concerns. Edelman and Simon (1971) 
maintained: “In his political opinions, the political assassin always reflects a point of view 
held with greater or less intensity by many other people as well. . . . It is this widespread 
support and opposition to his political views that endows his dramatic action with more 
than personal meaning” (p. 456). Crotty (1971) put it very directly: “One thing is clear: The 
(Presidential) assassins struck at the office, not the man. They had no personal relation-
ships with their victims, no animosity directed against them as individuals, and frequently 
even no knowledge of their personalities or actions when in office” (p. 39). The contradic-
tion posed by differences political science research about assassination attempts and na-
tional newspaper coverage of them highlights the implications of a therapeutic frame of 
would-be assassins as mentally ill; whereas political science research recommends heeding 
the political implications of assassination attempts and the prevailing political contexts in 
which s/he operates, national media reduce the political problems situating such acts to 
instances caused by individual mental illness that require little public scrutiny. 
We understand these violent acts to constitute what feminist scholar Susan Bordo calls 
a “pathology of protest.” About anorexia, Bordo (1993) has observed that it is important to 
recognize an element of protest in the act of self-starvation against ideals of female domes-
ticity (p. 159), just as we might regard assassination attempts as containing such an element 
of protest against reigning economic and social conditions. Even so, Bordo has cautioned 
critics against celebrating such forms of resistance, recognizing that there is neither con-
scious politics nor “any social political understanding at all. . . . The symptoms themselves 
function to preclude the emergence of such an understanding” (p. 159). The present study 
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shows how news media amplified “the symptoms” to preclude the emergence of a social 
and political understanding on the part of the reading public. 
 
Conclusion: Reconsidering Pathological Explanations for National Disease 
 
In summary, this article has described how news coverage of assassination attempts has 
portrayed the president and nation as vulnerable (and therefore in need of reassurance) 
and introduced the attackers as lonely, sick, and demented (and therefore in need of treatment 
or incarceration). Even though the attackers’ desperate attempts to have a public impact 
received some attention, this attention appeared after journalistic coverage largely reduced 
assassins’ often-complex political motivations to personal derangement. This therapeutic 
framing may have deflected attention from public issues such as inequality toward inter-
pretations that framed disaffection as pathology. This trope is both producer and product 
of an impoverished public life (Habermas, 1989; see also Asen & Brouwer, 2001; Calhoun, 
1993; Crossley & Roberts, 2004). Political assassination attempts represent just one instance 
in which media frames may discourage publics from thinking politically about violence 
and tragedy. 
The implications of our study bear upon news coverage of other violent ruptures. For 
example, coverage of the University of Texas Tower shootings by Charles Whitman in 1966 
neglected to mention his status as a Vietnam veteran facing what we would now call post-
traumatic stress (Eberly, 2003). Hoerl’s (2002) analysis of newspaper coverage of the Col-
umbine High School shootings contends that the framing of the shooters as monstrous and 
pathological youth derailed public discussion of the hierarchy, bullying, and social and 
economic anxiety afflicting suburban schools. In each case, public issues were reduced to 
personal madness in the therapeutic news frame. In each case, shooters’ resorting to vio-
lence could be interpreted as attempts at publicity in the absence of public fora in which 
their grievances could have been heard. Future research could explore media coverage of 
other school shootings, including the 2007 massacre at Virginia Tech. In addition, future 
research could provide analysis of televisual and computer-mediated coverage to deter-
mine whether the therapeutic pattern prevails there, and to what extent. In addition, the 
insights of our analysis of presidential assassination attempts might be explored in future 
research with regard to the coverage of other instances and forms of violence, including 
terrorism (see Zinn, 2002). 
This analysis suggests that print journalism practices require additional framing 
techniques that cultivate a political information environment in which American citizens 
might think about such tragic and dramatic events beyond psychological and individualistic 
terms. Rubenstein (1971) has argued that assassination attempts are manifestations of 
“mal-distributed power” (p. 430). As political scholar Greening (1971) writes: 
 
The label “insane” has ceased to be an adequate explanation of such complex 
personal and social acts. By understanding the forces that made him and seeing 
how they rise out of the basic nature of our imperfect community of man [sic], 
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we can grasp more clearly the fact that each assassin is but a symptom of man-
kind’s [sic] violence, pain and loneliness. Our civilization produces the assassin 
and he will tell us how far we still have to go. (pp. 265–266) 
 
Further critical analysis of media texts may interrupt the therapeutic framing of public 
violence as we have attempted to do. In the context of massive social inequality and ongo-
ing war, critical scholarship might draw attention to the ways in which seemingly irra-
tional violence is a symptom of both inequality and anomie. This project requires that we 
interpret assassination attempts and other forms of public violence as products of the rou-
tine violence and hardship experienced by ordinary people. Such political and critical 
frames lend nuanced understanding to the role of spectacular forms of violence in public 
life. Likewise, such scholarship might expose the limits of commercial mass media for un-
derstanding how the structural environments in which people are embedded constrain 
opportunities for citizenship and contribute to moments of political violence. 
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Notes 
 
1. On June 21, 1982, Hinckley was found not guilty by reason of insanity (the only individual in 
this study to be so regarded). Hinckley’s sentence set off a debate about the insanity defense 
and, after this verdict, many states and the U.S. Congress enacted changes in the insanity de-
fense. 
2. Specifically, they found that: A high rate of assassination is positively related to systemic frus-
tration, external conflict, minority tensions, and homicide rates, as well as to political instability 
and violence. The higher the levels of systemic frustration, external conflict, minority tension, 
homicide rates, and general political violence within a society, the higher the assassination rates. 
3. The New York Times coverage of Hinckley’s shooting of President Reagan provides a stark ex-
ception to this trend. The spectacular nature of Hinckley’s infatuation with the then adolescent 
film star Jodie Foster as well as the injuries to President Reagan during the attack explains why 
the newspaper continued to contribute several articles to the subject toward the end of that 
week. Despite the continued number of articles assigned to Hinckley’s attempt on President 
Reagan’s life, the length of newspaper articles in the New York Times declined as the week ended, 
thus reinforcing the pattern created by coverage of other assassination attempts. 
4. Locy (1995, D01) quotes U.S. Attorney Eric H. Holder: “‘Very often in society, people try to use 
excuses to deflect responsibility,’ he said. ‘This jury has sent a message to people like this that 
bogus excuses will not be tolerated.’” 
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